New Tools, Same Games: On the Interconnected Internet Interests and Relations between China and the USA and the Broader Global Implications of “Networked Authoritarianism”

DERAKHSHAN QURBAN-ALI, University of Toronto

In “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism,’” Rebecca MacKinnon discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has adapted to and embraced the growth of the Internet in China. She notes that strategies to break down the Great Firewall are predicated on the affirmation that the Internet is an enormous Trojan Horse that will eventually disempower the CCP from within its borders, eventually getting rid of the authoritarian government in a similar manner to the way international broadcasting lead to the end of Communism in the Cold War.[1] However, the Chinese model appears to be working in the CCP’s favour and serving to further legitimize their regime on the whole. This paper seeks to explain why the CCP is succeeding in “networked authoritarianism” and how the actions of the US government and corporations are in fact supporting, as opposed to hindering the objectives of the CCP in relation to Internet policy and surveillance, while simultaneously decreasing the amount of civil liberties enjoyed online in the US. Furthermore, the CCP’s government-monitored model for the Internet serves as an exemplar for countries around the world as a result of its effectiveness in controlling the content and modalities through which its citizens can discuss or employ change. The success of “networked authoritarianism” in China (with the backing of Western companies) has hindered the development of democracy in China while reflecting the parallel deterioration of democracy in the USA and other countries. This indicates a broader global trend towards increased control and censorship of the Internet.

Yasheng Huang, a prominent Chinese scholar, believes that the Internet “has empowered the Chinese people more than the combined effects of 30 years of [economic] growth, urbanization, exports, and investment by foreign firms.”[2] He stresses the relative advancement in freedoms and free speech compared to 10 or 20 years ago, as a result of the platform the Internet has provided for Chinese citizens to communicate with each other.[3] The creation of an “E-Parliament” and annual “web-chats” with the Premier/President indicates the CCP’s increasing responsiveness to its citizenry.[4] Talbot’s article highlights the complexity of China’s Internet structure, because the contemporary stereotype often brings forward oversimplified conceptions of censorship and authoritarianism that detract from meaningful analysis. China’s Internet is growing both in complexity and absolute size, as Chinese Internet users now make up nearly a quarter of the world total.[5] Misconceptions of censorship leads to increased confusion; Talbot points out that many assume censored to mean dead or artificial, but in reality, censorship is a lot more complicated because the Chinese government has the world’s most sophisticated national Internet filtering system.[6] Government officials are not the only ones in charge of censoring, as the CCP has indoctrinated a culture of self-censorship among its citizens, organizations and businesses. Censored topics normally involve criticisms of the regime, the promotion of democracy, or human rights.[7]

Specific incidents are also censored, namely those concerning Tibetan independence, Tiananmen Square, and various human/natural disasters.[8] Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry is a 2012 documentary film about Chinese artist and activist Ai Weiwei and the complex interaction between social activism and artistic practice.[9] The Chinese government persecuted him when he attempted to document the deaths of school children and investigate the Sichuan Earthquake Scandal in 2008, when school buildings collapsed and killed more than 5000 children.[10] For some, Ai Weiwei represents the dynamic relationship between Chinese citizens and their government, which is rapidly changing as a result of increased access to the Internet. Ai Weiwei provides a competing narrative of events alongside the government of China’s official accounts, which challenges the current power balance while being portrayed as a threat to the Chinese government’s power and authority. Ai Weiwei’s experience illustrates the emerging role individual citizens can play as agents of change in Chinese society, as a result of increased access to the Internet.

Scholar Yiyi Lu notes that citizens using the Internet to bring government corruption to light may actually increase the legitimacy of the party because the government is willing to take actions against officials exposed for misconduct online.[11] This is largely in part because the Chinese government has been increasingly concerned that the widespread government corruption would cause political instability; thus, by responding to the demands of citizens, they are more likely to remain in power.[12] The increasing amount of online activism in China cannot be interpreted as a sign of democratization without understanding the type of change taking place. The Internet is likely to prolong the CCP’s rule by reinforcing its domestic legitimacy while the Party responds to political and legal reforms.  However, Talbot also believes that all of these developments may amount to an Internet version of the Beijing Consensus predicated upon China’s success as an example.[13] Although there will likely be changes and compromises on both ends for some time to come, it does not appear as though the Chinese government will be overcome by dissent in the near future. They have grown with, adapted to, and embraced technological developments, using them to their advantage.

Professor Guobin Yan analyzed countless cases where Chinese citizens utilized the Internet to enact change in their society by bringing local injustices to national attention.[14] The Internet has in fact brought a social revolution to China, but the most significant change is occurring within the Great Firewall.[15] The Chinese government deploys a range of techniques and strategies to control what Chinese citizens can discuss and organize online. The tools include: cyber-attacks, device and network controls, domain name controls, localized disconnection and restriction, surveillance, and “astroturfing”/public outreach.[16] The CCP is targeting human rights activists via their Google accounts, controlling who can have a .cn domain, and cutting off Internet to entire areas when they do not want them to communicate with the rest of the country. According to Mackinnon, these techniques can be divided into three different generations: the Chinese government uses many first-generation techniques (i.e. internet filtering), whereas many other countries are focusing on the second and third generation techniques to censor and control.[17]

There is a growing trend to mimic the CCP’s model of Internet control around the world. From RUNET in Russia to the regimes in Iran and in the Middle East/Africa, Internet filtering is becoming more and more common as various governments begin to crack down on online dissent through the use of anti-terrorism laws and safety measures.[18] Strong governments in weak or new democracies are using Internet controls to erode democracy and control citizens, while activists in the US are worried about the weakening of due process, which has allowed government access to networks owned and run by corporations in order to combat cyber crime.[19] Deibert and Rohozinski warned, “many of the legal mechanisms that legitimate control over cyberspace, and its militarization, are led by the advanced democratic countries of Europe and North America.”[20] Thus, China’s successful application of networked authoritarianism has become a model for various regimes across the world, indicating that the Internet and technology can be used to solidify legitimacy within an authoritarian regime as opposed to inevitably leading to democracy.

In Ethan Gutmann’s article, “Who lost China’s Internet?” he brings to light the role of the US in assisting the Chinese government in crafting the Internet as a tool of control as opposed to a force for democracy. He argues that the Internet may be the only force left that is potentially anti-hierarchical, “given the willingness of capitalists to work hand-in-hand with the Chinese regime.”[21] The Internet was thought to be a vehicle for change, as free speech spread and democracy took root. However, Gutmann believes that this future is being threatened as a result of the failure of American corporate values.[22] An interview with a Chinese employee of Cisco Systems led to revealing facts about the corporate relationship between China and the US. Cisco is well known for building corporate firewalls to block viruses and hackers; the Chinese government has hired Cisco for similar goals, but on a much larger scale. To force compliance with government objectives, they required the assistance of a networking giant such as Cisco in order to standardize the Internet in China and deploy national firewalls.[23] Thus, the US corporation, Cisco played an enormous role by developing a router device, integrator and firewall box designed specifically for the Chinese government’s telecommunications monopoly.[24] This is an example of where profits are prioritized over US ideology because China Telecom bought thousands of the twenty thousand dollar boxes and IBM coordinated the “high-end” financing.[25] What is even more concerning is that Cisco’s routers can be used to intercept information and conduct keyword searches; this is a serious concern for human rights activists in China.

One might think that because of the necessity for the cooperation of Western capitalists and their advanced firewall technology, that the corporations would be given significant influence in this regard. However, the CCP appears to be calling the shots because of the immensity of the profits involved, as Western companies enthusiastically compete to win the Party’s favour in business deals.[26] Companies such as Nortel, AOL, Netscape Communications, and Sun Microsystems have all played a part in helping the CCP distribute government propaganda, supporting the China Internet Corporations, and providing software for uses such as camera recognition technology.[27] Gutmann emphasizes that American technologies of surveillance, encryption, firewalls, and viruses have now been transferred to the Chinese and might one day be turned against our own freedom and Internet.[28] Essentially, he characterizes the actions of US corporations as ludicrous, because they “funded, built, and pushed into China what we thought was a Trojan horse, but we forgot to build the hatch.”[29] Incentivized by profit, American corporations have aided the CCP in regulating and controlling the Internet in China.

This paints a grim picture for the future of China’s Internet and begs the question as to whether it is beyond reclamation. At present, it appears that the Internet has now become a sophisticated tool of surveillance and repression of ideas, “managed by the Chinese government and serviced by cynical Western partners,”[30] but experts are continuously finding multiple vulnerabilities within China’s Internet surveillance. Gutmann concedes that the only practical solution is laughably unrealistic, which would be for the US to make Internet freedom in China a high priority in its international interests.[31] But this is highly unlikely to transpire due to the immense political and economic costs it would incur on the US administration. The American business presence, he concludes, is deeply compromised as an agent for liberalizing change.[32]

The US can place pressure on China to change its actions regarding the internet, but this usually only happens when economic interests are at stake, because large corporations will lobby the government to take action. For example, Green Dam Youth Escort was fiercely opposed by the US computer industry (because it violated the intellectual property rights of a US company’s filtering product) and by the US government, which lead China to abandon the idea right before its deadline, by making the installation of Green Dam voluntary instead of mandatory.[33] However, there was also significant domestic pressure because this software tracked and blocked political activities on the Internet in addition to protecting children from inappropriate online content.[34]

On China, Bill Clinton stated that trying to control the Internet in China would be like trying to “nail Jell-O to the wall.”[35]Although the US is one of the largest critiques of China’s human rights violations and Internet censorship, it has revealed itself to be hypocritical in its policy and business transactions. US companies pave the way for Internet surveillance in China while brokering multi-million dollar deals that indirectly suppress free thought and flow of information in China. Furthermore, it is evident that multitudes of countries around the world are censoring or controlling the Internet output of their citizens in some form and that China has become a leader in its own censorship model. All of this leads one to question the hypocrisy coming from the United States government when reports emerge of parallel surveillance, censorship, and violation of personal freedoms in America.

For example, Tim Clemente, a former FBI counterterrorism agent, revealed that the true capabilities and actions of the US surveillance state, “are almost entirely unknown to the American public because, like most things of significance done by the US government, it operates behind an impenetrable wall of secrecy.”[36] This mirrors the “information gap” experienced by Chinese citizens in relation to the actions of their government in China. According to the human rights organization, Dui Hua Foundation, arrests and indictments on charges of “endangering state security” had doubled in 2008 for the second time in three years.[37] Average Chinese citizens are seldom aware of these trends. This “information gap” lowers the chances that citizens will mobilize and seek political change; this mirrors the information gap found in the United States when it comes to online surveillance. In the US, the small numbers of interest groups and companies that control the media in the country have a lot of leverage, comparable to that of the CCP.

Clemente asserted on CNN that all telephone calls made in the United States are recorded and accessible to the US government.[38] Following the tragic events that occurred during the Boston Marathon Bombing, investigation commenced into the motives of the deceased suspect, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and whether his wife, Katherine Russell had any part to play in the scheme. Clemente in an interview conceded “we certainly have ways in national security investigations to find out exactly what was said in that conversation…welcome to America. All of that stuff is being captured as we speak whether we know it or like it or not.”[39] He later added that all digital communications in the past are recorded and stored, which is disconcertingly akin to the invasive measures the CCP undertakes in the lives of its citizens in order to preserve the peace. Greenwald describes this confession as indicative of an ubiquitous, limitless “Surveillance State” in the US.[40]

Interestingly enough, this is just the latest in revelations about the American Surveillance State. A former AT&T engineer revealed that AT&T and other telecoms had built a special network that allowed the National Security Agency full and unrestricted access to data about the telephone calls and the content of email communications for all of their customers.[41] The Washington Post in 2010 reported “every day, collection systems at the National Security Agency intercept and store 1.7 billion emails, phone calls, and other types of communications.”[42] The CCP surveys and controls their population on Party lines and a doctrine of a more harmonious society. The United States, on the other hand, operates with the same tools as China, but under the guise of “national security.” The 9/11 attacks were a catalyst for increased security measures, restricted personal freedoms, and a greater tolerance for invasions of privacy. Following the attacks, the US government attempted to employ the “Total Information Awareness” program, but it caused so much outrage among the public that it had to be abandoned.[43] Ironically, most of the measures in the Total information Awareness program have subsequently been implemented slowly over the past few years, without the knowledge of most of the American public.[44] This was completely unaligned with the basic principles of democracy and transparency.

This discussion is intended to reveal the greater context of debates on the state’s control over the Internet in China and to analyze US government criticisms with a degree of healthy skepticism. US President Barack Obama condemned the UAE’s ban on the use of Blackberries (because some communications were inaccessible to government intelligence agencies) while simultaneously demanding of his own country’s companies and citizens that all forms of digital communications allow government backdoor access to intercept them.[45] The erosion of civil liberties in the US in the wake of terrorist threats to homeland security are very comparable to the erosion of civil liberties on the Internet in China in the wake of dissimilar threats to the state.

The persecution of those who attempt to free the flow of information occurs in the US, just as it does in China. On 6 January 2011, MIT police on state breaking and entering charges arrested Aaron Swartz because he downloaded academic journal articles en masse from JSTOR in an attempt to make knowledge publically available and accessible.[46] Federal prosecutors charged him with wire fraud and in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which carried charges cumulating to one million dollars in fines as well as 35 years of prison, asset forfeiture, restitution and supervised release.[47] Aaron Swartz was a prominent online activist who led the way in creating awareness to stop SOPA. Swartz worked on the Creative Commons licensing system, helped launch the social media site Reddit, promoted the Open Library to assist book access, and co-founded the civil liberties group Demand Progress.[48] Two years after his arrest, he committed suicide and many fault the government for his death.[49] His situation can be compared to those in China who are punished for circumventing the system, by those who value corporate profit over freedom of information.

Even more alarming in recent US history are the ever-returning attempts of private interest groups trying to push bills past the House and Senate that completely disregard the 4^th amendment, severely violate civil liberties and any conception of privacy. Online activists and web companies managed to prevent the bill, Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) from passing last year and they stated that any future attempts to push through legislation that threatened digital freedoms would also be met with an equal amount of outrage and opposition. SOPA would have allowed intellectual property owners such as movie studios and record labels to effectively dismantle foreign sites that they have a copyright claim against.[50] This would allow IP owners take actions without a court appearance or judicial sign-off and would effectively create an Internet Black List.[51]

Moreover, on 18 April 2013, the controversial CISPA bill (Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act) passed the US House and was well on its way to the Upper Senate Chamber for approval.[52] The passing of CISPA would “allow private sector firms to search personal and sensitive user data of ordinary U.S. residents to identify “threat information,” which can then be shared with other opt-in firms and the U.S. government — without the need for a court-ordered warrant.”[53] This would essentially invalidate the 4^th Amendment online and would mean that companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, cell phone providers, etc. would be able to share one’s personal information and data to the US government (for any reason) and its law enforcement with no legal repercussions.[54] The US Fourth Amendment guarantees: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”[55] The lack of regard for American civil liberties is overwhelming in CISPA and it indicates a growing trend around the world to regulate and control the online population. In this context, the actions of the CCP do not seem as extreme or unique.

In fact, the CCP has often defended its Internet Censorship by pointing out that it was a common practice around the world to remove “illegal and harmful” information.[56] Liu Zhengrong used the New York Times as an example, stating that the popular newspaper will delete from its forums any messages that it finds “abusive, defamatory, obscene, in violation of copyright or trademark laws, or otherwise unacceptable.”[57] Although there are discrepancies in the comparison, it does illustrate the widespread and everyday use of censorship all around the world.

The Internet in China has been compared to many things in a plethora of metaphors: a Trojan horse, a Trojan horse without a door, a giant cage,[58] etc. Trying to simplify the phenomenon may make it easier to conceptualize, but it is not possible to encompass all of the complex features and factors at play in the growth and development of the Internet in China. The growth of the Internet in China will lead to many reforms and developments that are beneficial to the Chinese population, although it will not likely spark any sort of mass political reform. Western corporations coordinating and working hand-in-hand with the CCP ultimately hinder change and play a large role in how the internet develops and adapts; the corporate money flow will likely determine the future trajectory of the Internet in China. The CCP understands that in order to remain in power, it has to respond to the major concerns of its citizens. It clearly has to give a little (in terms of responsiveness) in order to maintain its power over the people, so a calculated adjustment of policy and action should be expected.

The parallels between the CISPA and the CCP’s Internet laws are striking and indicate a growing global trend towards the control or suppression of free speech. Scholars predicted that globalization would lead to liberation of thought, expression and ideas worldwide, but it is important to note that globalization also entails the spread of the technologies that oppress free thought and obstruct the liberation of information. The Chinese model and technology will ultimately serve as a global model to control Internet usage and by extension, citizens worldwide. The parallels between CCP policy and new policies being pushed by the US Government (particularly CISPA) as well as other governments around the world are striking and deeply concerning. In all cases, the government seeks increased control of the Internet and personal information in order to fight “threats” to the homeland.

Greenwald ends on the thought that “mass surveillance is the hallmark of a tyrannical political culture.”[59] The growing trend of surveillance and censorship across the world through all forms of telecommunication and media is alarming and possibly indicative of the direction of international Internet usage. Perhaps the question should not be when China will liberalize its Internet restrictions, but instead, when the rest of the world will either tighten restrictions on their Internet or be more forthcoming about the tight restrictions that are already in place. Chinese Internet regulation and censorship is only a stone throw’s distance from the invasive and non-transparent actions the US government is already undertaking. Combined with the fact that US technology and US companies are driving the surveillance and censorship efforts in China, one has to question the underlying motives and hidden trajectories of Internet regulation. A change in perspective leads to more insightful answers and more complex questions with regard to China’s “networked authoritarianism” and the greater global implications of its success.

Bibliography

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Greenwald, Glenn. “Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible to the US Government?” The Guardian, May 04, 2013. Accessed May 04, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston.

Gutmann, Ethan. “Who Lost China’s Internet?” The Weekly Standard, February 25, 2002, 24-29. Accessed April 26, 2013. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/233019026?accountid=14771.

Lu, Yiyi. “Online Protests in China: Internet Manhunts.” The World Today 65, no. 8/9 (August 01, 2009): 16-17. Accessed April 26, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/41549186?ref=search-gateway:959232cb9cebe4cdf9ef5719aaaa8ae1.

Mackinnon, Rebecca. “China’s “Networked Authoritarianism”” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 32-46. Accessed April 27, 2013. doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.

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Talbot, David. “China’s Internet Paradox.” Technology Review, 2010, 62-67. Accessed April 24, 2013. http://search.proquest.com/docview/504814900?accountid=14771.

Whittaker, Zack. “CISPA Passes U.S. House: Death of the Fourth Amendment?” ZDNet. April 18, 2013. Accessed April 26, 2013. http://www.zdnet.com/cispa-passes-u-s-house-death-of-the-fourth-amendment-7000014205/.

Footnotes

[1] Rebecca Mackinnon, “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism'” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 34, accessed April 27, 2013, doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.
[2] David Talbot, “China’s Internet Paradox,” Technology Review, 2010, 62, accessed April 24, 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/504814900?accountid=14771.
[3] Ibid., 63.
[4] Rebecca Mackinnon, “China’s “Networked Authoritarianism”” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 37, accessed April 27, 2013, doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.
[5] Ibid., 64.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 65
[9] Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry, dir. Alison Klayman (USA: MUSE Film and Television, 2012), DVD.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Yiyi Lu, “ONLINE PROTESTS IN CHINA: Internet Manhunts,” The World Today 65, no. 8/9 (August 01, 2009): 17, accessed April 26, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/41549186?ref=search-gateway:959232cb9cebe4cdf9ef5719aaaa8ae1.
[12] Ibid.
[13] David Talbot, “China’s Internet Paradox,” Technology Review, 2010, 67, accessed April 24, 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/504814900?accountid=14771.
[14] Rebecca Mackinnon, “China’s “Networked Authoritarianism”” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 34, accessed April 27, 2013, doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., 43.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., 44.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ethan Gutmann, “Who Lost China’s Internet?,” The Weekly Standard, February 25, 2002, 1, accessed April 26, 2013, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/233019026?accountid=14771.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid., 2.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 2.
[26] Rebecca Mackinnon, “China’s “Networked Authoritarianism”” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 39, accessed April 27, 2013, doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.
[27] Ethan Gutmann, “Who Lost China’s Internet?,” The Weekly Standard, February 25, 2002, 3, accessed April 26, 2013, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/233019026?accountid=14771.
[28] Ibid., 4.
[29] Ibid., 5.
[30] Ibid., 7.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 6.
[33] Rebecca Mackinnon, “China’s “Networked Authoritarianism”” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 39, accessed April 27, 2013, doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.
[34] Ibid.
[35] “China’s Internet: A Giant Cage,” The Economist, April 6, 2013, accessed April 28, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled.
[36] Glenn Greenwald, “Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible to the US Government?,” The Guardian, May 04, 2013, accessed May 04, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston.
[37] Rebecca Mackinnon, “China’s “Networked Authoritarianism”” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 33, accessed April 27, 2013, doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.
[38] Glenn Greenwald, “Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible to the US Government?,” The Guardian, May 04, 2013, accessed May 04, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Dana Priest, “A Hidden World, Growing beyond Control,” The Washington Post, July 19, 2010, accessed April 28, 2013, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/print/.
[43] Glenn Greenwald, “Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible to the US Government?,” The Guardian, May 04, 2013, accessed May 04, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Jim Naureckas, “Aaron Swartz, 1986-2013,” FAIR Fairness Accuracy In Reporting, March 1, 2013, accessed April 29, 2013, http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/aaron-swartz-1986-2013/.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Brian Barrett, “What Is SOPA?,” Gizmodo, January 17, 12, accessed April 28, 2013, http://gizmodo.com/5877000/what-is-sopa.
[51] Brian Barrett, “What Is SOPA?,” Gizmodo, January 17, 12, accessed April 28, 2013, http://gizmodo.com/5877000/what-is-sopa.
[52] Zack Whittaker, “CISPA Passes U.S. House: Death of the Fourth Amendment?,” ZDNet, April 18, 2013, accessed April 26, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/cispa-passes-u-s-house-death-of-the-fourth-amendment-7000014205/.
[53] Zack Whittaker, “CISPA Passes U.S. House: Death of the Fourth Amendment?,” ZDNet, April 18, 2013, accessed April 26, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/cispa-passes-u-s-house-death-of-the-fourth-amendment-7000014205/.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] “China Defends Internet Censorship,” TechWeb, February 15, 2006, accessed April 26, 2013, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/201498572?accountid=14771.
[57] “China Defends Internet Censorship,” TechWeb, February 15, 2006, accessed April 26, 2013, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/201498572?accountid=14771.
[58] “China’s Internet: A Giant Cage,” The Economist, April 6, 2013, accessed April 28, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled.
[59] Glenn Greenwald, “Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible to the US Government?,” The Guardian, May 04, 2013, accessed May 04, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston.